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The Persistent Nucleus: Atoms, Power and  
Energy Policy Discourse in the Anthropocene
Manu V. Mathai and Govindan Parayil
Abstract: Despite economic debacles, recurring “accidents”, reactor core meltdowns in 
Chernobyl and Fukushima and the cautious academic reflection it has engendered, civilian 
nuclear power continues to enjoy legitimacy in energy policy discourse. This may not be the 
case in all countries. But it is so in a number of influential states, such as, prominently, all the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. Why does nuclear power persist in these and 
other key countries, such as India or Iran and Japan? How is it that economic costs, technology 
risks and weapons proliferation concerns point in one direction while energy policy and 
technology choice moves in the other? We suggest that for an important set of select countries 
this divergence can be ascribed to a “discourse of power” that is pegged to domestic concerns 
and, more importantly, to international relations. This discursive process constructs energy 
and material abundance as the cornerstone of social stability, political power and ultimately 
national sovereignty and geopolitical influence. The atom’s energy remains prominent in 
such imaginaries of abundance, more so in contexts of fossil energy insecurity and climate 
change. The questioning then of nuclear power by environmental and social concerns has 
to also question this discourse of power. The latter’s sanguinity vis-a-vis abundant energy 
needs to be problematised. This is not the case today in international relations. Practitioners 
focus on the consequences of environmental deterioration. The problem of climate refugees, 
for example. This paper argues that realist frames of power and self-interest in international 
relations be acknowledged explicitly as drivers of the discourse of power and in turn the 
socio-ecological consequences that ensue from this pursuit of cheap and abundant energy. To 
challenge nuclear power ultimately is to also challenge this medieval yet dominant norm of 
power play that pervades large swathes of international relations.
Keywords: Sufficiency, Sustainability, International relations, Technology choice, Energy 
policy, Environmental governance.
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Introduction
Proponents of nuclear power assert its indispensability for a future that is secure, equitable, 
and sustainable.1 They insist that problems confronting nuclear power such as cost escalation, 
routine accidents and rare, but catastrophic events, disposal of radioactive waste and weapons 
proliferation will be resolved by future iterations of reactor designs and innovative technologies. 
Each successive generation of innovations in reactor technology and design claims to address 
safety concerns and cost escalations. For the policy discourse on energy technology choice, this 
thinking asserts that these problems will ultimately be fixed (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2017; Magwood & 
Paillere 20172; Siegel, Gilmore, Gallagher & Fetter 2017). This is to be expected. It is, after all, the 
nature of “modern technique” (Ellul 1964). In such a context, a critique of nuclear power today 
for its technical shortcomings, remains hostage to a promised future. We might argue that nearly 
seven decades of commercial civilian nuclear power operations have not yet brought us to this 
promised nuclear powered utopia. That argument however is overrun by renewed promises of a 
different future outcome (Ramana 2012). This dominance of the future tense offers limited clarity 
for policy deliberations scrutinising the role of nuclear power in energy policy.
This paper, therefore, examines nuclear power from a different vantage point. We problematise the 
discursive construction of nuclear power as an essential, even inevitable energy technology option 
through a “discourse of power3” that is employed in political rhetoric, in technology assessment 
protocols and in energy policy praxis. Unlike the perennial promise to fix the technical failures and 
shortcomings of nuclear power (which are contingent on a vast number of variables ranging from 
scientific discovery, technical innovation, economic conditions and institutional capacities), the 
discourse of power, which rationalises the whole endeavour in the first place, cannot escape critical 
scrutiny by resorting to the future tense widely employed in assessments and analyses of technical 
failure and shortcomings. 
1 For an extreme version of this view, advocating a nuclear and nothing else energy policy path, see Brook, Blees, Wigley & 
Hong (2018).
2 Also see accompanying papers in this special issue of the journal on the theme “Shippingport 60th Anniversary: A Time to 
Take Stock of Nuclear Energy’s Status”.
3 Power, as in the capacity to transform energy (Joules per second) and simultaneously an entity’s ability to influence another 
entity’s behavior.
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The discourse of power can be pinned down and scrutinised for resonance with advancing a 
contemporary policy imperative in light of pressing social and ecological crises: that of building 
fairness in human well-being outcomes on a shared and finite planet. Crucially, for us, discursive 
constructs are not immutable natural laws governing the organisation of societies (Morrow & 
Brown 1994). They can be profitably examined to open up possibilities for reflexive change 
in influential “material and semiotic” (Escobar 1996) imaginations that shape development, 
environment and energy policy. Doing so remains a less explored approach of evaluating the 
sustainability claims advanced by proponents of nuclear power, and, more generally, in the 
assessment of energy technology options.
The three dimensions of the discourse of power we employ are the “progressive state” initially 
identified by classical economists and further entrenched through the neo-classical framing of 
economic policy; the “peaceful uses” illusions about nuclear technology utilised by the ruling elite; 
and ultimately and overwhelmingly geopolitics that informs decision-making in select countries 
with regard to development, energy and environmental policy. A discourse that construes material 
well-being, social stability and ultimately national sovereignty as contingencies of power, bolsters 
commitment to nuclear power and more generally to “abundant energy machines” (Byrne & Rich, 
1986) by governments across the world. Within this discursive normalisation of abundant energy, 
technical and economic difficulties and socio-ecological consequences confronting an abundant 
energy technology are merely temporary setbacks.
In debates on nuclear power, in the academic literature or in the environmental movement, this 
rationalisation for abundant energy machines as the basis of power, and the socio-ecological 
consequences that ensue, remains inadequately considered. The argument we seek to explore 
therefore is that the state of international relations and the pursuit of national power must be 
acknowledged as drivers of energy policy priorities of select nation-states. The resulting demand 
for faster and higher energy and material throughput of these economies not only bolsters 
nuclear power, but the long-standing commitment to fossil fuels and more recently, utility-scale 
renewables4. The socio-ecological consequences that obtain from such energy policy commitments 
are thus also contingent on geopolitics and the pursuit of power by nation-states. Ultimately, in light 
4 Insightful scrutiny of the alternativeness of utility-scale renewable energy has been around for decades. See for example, 
Lovins (1977); Glover (2006); more recently see, for example, Yenneti and Day (2016) on the implementation of utility-scale 
solar energy projects in India. Also see Saldanha and Rao (2013) for a civil society report on the intersection of utility-scale 
solar, big science, appropriation of the commons, sustainability and livelihoods. The concern about utility-scale renewables 
as this literature makes apparent is two-fold. First, they suffer from a deficit of democratic decision making in the manner 
that conventional big energy technologies ranging from dams, or coal-fired power plants and nuclear power stations do. 
Second, a corollary of this exclusion in decision making, is the fact that costs incurred owing to their construction and 
operation are highly skewed in their allocation and often map axes of power and privilege. Rural, tribal or forest communities 
are often dealt with the burden of dealing with dramatic land-use changes, pollution and risks arising from accidents. The 
benefits, in the form of electricity provisioning, are just as often directed to urban and metropolitan populations. For these 
reasons, even while not being the primary focus of this paper, utility-scale renewable energy technologies are alluded to 
here as needing more careful scrutiny in energy policy deliberations. Proponents of renewable energy often overlook these 
aspects and instead choose to focus only on the replacement of fossil fuels or nuclear power with energy from renewable 
sources. While certainly of benefit, whether this type of fuel switching amounts to a qualitative difference in energy-society 
relations, as called for by energy policy scholars in the context of that socio-ecological conditions that have presently 
obtained (e.g. Byrne et al. 2006), is questionable.
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of contemporary socio-ecological realities and dire projections of these trends, this formulation 
requires the normalisation in vast swathes of energy policy, of nation-states competing with each 
other, to be discarded. Living in the anthropocene requires that we evolve beyond inherited medieval 
vocabularies. It needs a discourse of fairness on a shared and finite planet.
The Progressive State
Nuclear power has always been imagined and talked about in superlative terms. The atom’s energy 
was deemed to be so abundant, it was said that man could now make the ‘deserts bloom and melt 
the polar ice caps’ (Wells 1914; Soddy 1920: 183; Nehru quoted in Agarwal 1996: 20; Bhabha 1955: 
126, among others5). Such euphoria may well be excused as a case of beginners’ over enthusiasm. It 
was however anything but short-lived. It resonated with emergent narratives in political economy 
that constructed abundance as a pre-condition of viable human societies. A good illustration of 
such discursive production can be seen in the following assessment of political economy offered by 
Adam Smith:
…perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, when the society is advancing to the 
further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, 
that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be 
the happiest and most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the 
declining state. The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state to 
all the different orders of the society. The stationary is dull; the declining melancholy 
(Smith [1776] 1994: 93).
Two centuries later Charles Maier (1977) identified a far more influential articulation of this 
political economy in the U.S.’s policy advocacy as it sought to shape a new international order after 
World War II. He termed this far-reaching economic, trade and labour policy stance that sought to 
“adjourn class conflict for a consensus on growth” as the “politics of productivity.” Maier (1977) 
argues that the motivations of U.S. were not sufficiently explained by concerns about domestic 
unemployment after the war stimulus ended, or even by a nationalistic and capitalist expansion – 
a sort of anti-communist ideological project. In addition to these drivers, Maier (1977) points out 
that U.S. representatives shaping and advocating post-war economic policy in Europe and East Asia 
took inspiration from how a focus on efficiency and productivity helped redress “domestic social 
division and political stalemates.” The Americans were advocating a political economy best practice 
of sorts, derived from their own enviable (at that time) domestic experiences. As Maier (1977: 609) 
notes “Americans asked foreigners to subordinate their domestic and international conflicts for 
the sake of higher steel tonnage or kilowatt hours precisely because agreement on production and 
efficiency had helped bridge deep divisions at home.”
5 See Weart (1985) for a review of the dualistic Armageddon or Golden Age imagery associated with nuclear power in the 
twentieth century.
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What we see here is that a constant condition of “further acquisition ... of riches”, an economic 
technique, is offered as the politics to redress exploitation, inequality, social conflict, and, ultimately 
to emancipate the individual. Of course such a political imagination was made possible with the 
advent of the fossil fuel era and the unprecedented access to abundant and cheap energy (Mumford 
1934; Yergin 1991). When nuclear power arrived later as steam and electricity, it fit right in. As 
far as society’s presumed act of technology choice is concerned, in this context, Langdon Winner 
(1986: 45) notes, “…the form of the technology you adopt does not matter. If you have cornucopia 
in your grasp, you do not worry about its shape. Insofar as it is a powerful thing, more power to 
it.” Atomic energy promises cornucopia and more. In a carbon-constrained future, the possibility, 
even if distant, of carbon free cornucopia is particularly appealing to a political economy built on 
the “politics of productivity.” It is not so much the immediate empirical circumstances that frames 
scrutiny of nuclear power, but its promise of abundant and cheap energy that carries the day.
Power Play
It is evident that a majority of countries that can acquire nuclear technology are not doing so 
(Abraham, 2010). That is to say, all countries cannot be considered to have the same interest in 
nuclear energy. What accounts for this difference between countries? We suggest that countries 
vary in their interest in powerful energy technology capabilities, such as independent nuclear 
know-how and/or infrastructure, commensurate with their degree of entanglement with the 
discourse of power. The degree of this entanglement is influenced by a nation’s aspiration to 
regional or global power; i.e. its priorities with regard to maintaining the geopolitical status quo, to 
alter it in some fashion or to rearrange it in their favour. How might such entanglement with the 
discourse of power be discerned and the resulting commitment to nuclear power (despite economic 
and technical evidence to the contrary) observed?
That countries differ in their international status, power and capabilities is evident in the routine fact 
of country groupings and the hierarchy of such groupings in the conduct of international relations. 
For example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, individually, and, 
as a group, have a privileged role in matters affecting international peace, security and national 
sovereignty through the veto power they enjoy over Security Council decisions, even when any 
of them is an interested party in a decision. How did they come to this privileged position in 
international relations? What attribute about these countries legitimised their elevation in 1945 as 
permanent members of the Security Council with these privileges? 
The answer to that question traces the role of power in the reading of international relations. As 
Hurd (2007:18) notes, “all approaches to international relations agree that state power is important 
and that the strong generally succeed in shaping the system to their interests.” A brief look at the 
formative negotiations of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), and specifically the question of 
veto power arrogated by the permanent members of the Security Council, illustrates this. The San 
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Francisco Conference of 1945, at the end of which the United Nations Charter was unanimously 
approved, is widely known. Prior to this meeting it was only the “Big Three” viz. United States, 
United Kingdom and Soviet Union – (joined later also by Republic of China, to constitute the “Big 
Four”) – who engaged in a series of written exchanges, before moving to face-to-face negotiations 
in Washington D.C. and Yalta between 1943 and 1945. It was at these meetings that the charter of 
the UNO was drafted.
The form of the Security Council and the veto power over the Council’s decisions given only to 
each permanent member were also decided here. As Hurd (2007: 84) notes, “from their earliest 
discussions, the Big Three were in agreement that it was unacceptable that they should commit 
themselves to an organisation that could embark on any type of enforcement action which they 
themselves had voted against.” Yet, as Ikenberry (quoted in Hurd, 2007:10) notes, “Great Powers 
have an ‘incentive to create a legitimate order after (major wars),’ both to reduce enforcement 
costs and to lock in their favourable positions.” The San Francisco Conference of 1945 was held to 
assemble the rank and file of the United Nations to do precisely this. Despite initial resistance to 
the inequality embodied by the veto power given to only the Great Powers, the latter did not yield. 
They succeeded in winning over smaller countries, thereby gaining legitimacy for the new UN 
Charter, as well as their privileged veto power over decisions of the Security Council (Hurd, 2007). 
They were able to lock in their interests into the critical architecture of the post-war world.
In this example, that remains relevant even today, state power translated into the ability of some 
countries to shape the post-war order. In the case of the Great Powers, this power was derived 
from an array of economic, organisational, technological and cultural resources that enabled these 
countries to prevail over the axis powers in the Second World War. In narrower energy policy 
terms, this power relied on abundant cheap energy. This was coal, primarily, and also oil. But 
in the post-war era, nuclear power made its appearance. And unsurprisingly, all the permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council were pioneers in developing nuclear weapons and 
harnessing the atom’s energy for electricity generation. This was not lost upon countries coming 
out of colonialism during that time - notably India - which like China, was an old civilisation with 
a vast territory, but whose reality of subjugation at that time was far removed from its own sense 
of place in the world.
In his autobiography published in 1945, Nehru offered two reasons for the heavy industrialisation 
model of economic development (and by extension nuclear power as an integral part of the attendant 
energy policy) he advocated for India. One is often apparent. Centralisation and industrialisation 
would enable economic growth and wealth production at higher rates (as compared to the alternative 
of small-scale, cottage industries) and were thus deemed critical given the imperative to alleviate 
poverty and raise quality of life. The scrutiny of such industrialisation and economic development 
is an established theme now in development studies, energy and environmental policy, and the 
science, technology and society (STS) literature.
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The second reason outlined by Nehru for the heavy industrialisation model is less widely recognised 
and its implications are further removed from deliberations on environment and energy policy. It is 
however central to the argument being made by this paper and we quote Nehru’s statement at length:
It can hardly be challenged that, in the context of the modern world, no country 
can be politically and economically independent, even within the framework of 
international interdependence, unless it is highly industrialised and has developed its 
power resources to the utmost. Nor can it achieve or maintain high standards of living and 
liquidate poverty without the aid of modern technology in almost every sphere of life. 
An industrially backward country will continually upset the world equilibrium and 
encourage the aggressive tendencies of more developed countries. Even it if retains 
its political independence, this will be nominal only, and economic control will pass 
to others. This control will inevitably upset its own small-scale economy which it has 
sought to preserve in pursuit of its own view of life. Thus, an attempt to build up a 
country’s economy largely on the basis of cottage and small-scale industries is doomed 
to failure. It will not solve the basic problems of the country or maintain freedom, nor 
will it fit in with the world framework, except as a colonial appendage (Nehru 1945: 407-408, 
emphasis added).
This argument for centralisation and heavy industrialisation as a precondition for sovereignty 
echoes reasons for nuclear power previewed in the previous section. Apart from nuclear bombs, 
nuclear power is here an energy option to sustain and/or further industrialisation for the purpose 
of protecting and/or asserting political and economic independence. It is not yet evident that 
economies based on decentralised industry and decentralised renewable energy can sustain the 
economic heft that bolsters the “Great Powers”. To that extent energy and strategic policy makers 
urge that the nuclear power option be kept within hand’s reach. India has invested in nuclear 
energy since 1945, and, despite considerable technological and economic setbacks and huge odds 
(Ramana 2012), the country persists with nuclear energy as a national priority.
Such thinking is evident in China as well. While Chinese nationalism has various strains that include 
belligerence and indifference in the sphere of international relations, it is apparent that a common 
thread connecting them is a deep narrative about the “century of humiliation” (1839–1949) of the 
Chinese nation by the old imperial powers. The governing consensus, in response to this humiliation, 
crystallised under Deng Xioping, was that “prerequisites for national unity were China’s wealth 
and power” and it complemented Mao Zedong’s conviction that a “wealthy and strong national 
government” was essential to mobilise resources and prevent further “victimisation” (Zheng 
1999:17). In this way, the ideal of maximising the development of power resources silently crosses 
over from geopolitics to the energy and economic development policy landscape.
The underlying tone of national victimhood (affected or real), the accompanying political 
psychological complexes and nationalist tropes remain alive in the vocabulary adopted by key 
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policy makers today. For instance, in a recent report on the work of the government, Premier 
Li Keiquang made it a point to assert that “China will safeguard its victory of World War II and 
the post war international order and will not allow anyone to reverse the course of history” (Li 
2014). A further level of complexity emerges when the need to distinguish protecting economic and 
political independence from the assertion of those interests is considered. An observation shared 
by Deng Xioping in 1974, at the United Nations General Assembly, frames this difficulty:
China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one. What is a superpower? 
A superpower is an imperialist country which everywhere subjects other countries 
to its aggression, interference, control, subversion or plunder and strives for world 
hegemony. If capitalism is restored in a big socialist country, it will inevitably become 
a superpower… (Deng 1974).
The world has changed dramatically since 1974 and China is now, after a four decade long sustained 
and rapid expansion of market based reforms and industrial production, often acknowledged as 
one of the most successful “capitalist” economies. Whatever version of capitalism one believes 
best captures China’s recent history, it calls to mind Deng’s prognostication about super power 
tendencies of “…aggression, interference, control…”. Is it not an incipient superpower, as Deng 
Xioping himself defined the term in 1974? China’s present economic influence across the world, 
bolstered by its multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative and its stance regarding its maritime 
claims and behaviour in the South China Sea demonstrate that China is seeking to influence 
a variety of states through a combination of economic heft and military power. Perhaps, in the 
government’s calculus such assertions of power are necessary steps to protect economic and 
political independence and “safeguard the victory of World War II”.
Despite claims of benign involvement in international relations, it seems apparent that 
industrialisation in countries of the size and ambition of China, cannot come to fruition without 
interests and power asserted at the expense of other nations. The fact that the G8, today’s club of 
rich and powerful countries (Canada6, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Russia and 
United States) comprises former imperial or colonial powers, underscores this point. Colonisation 
and imperialism were integral to capital accumulation, industrialisation, wealth creation and 
present positions of power and influence for these countries. The twenty-first century is unlikely 
to witness colonisation on the scale of the nineteenth century, but it follows from the history of 
the G8, that as countries such as China (re)emerge, they will of necessity assert their economic and 
political interests. 
6 While Canada was in the backseat during the great games of the twentieth century, which involved all the other seven, its 
history (similar to the United States) as a modern nation stands on the backs of British and French imperial expansion and 
colonization of what are today called the “First Nations” of North America. The other seven powers are readily known for 
their expansionary exploits at various points during the twentieth century. As recently as 2014, Russia was suspended from 
the G8, after its invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in March that year.
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These adventures of necessity (choice?) are known to require vast surpluses of wealth to enable 
economic, diplomatic and military power. The reflexivity and adaptability associated with energy 
technologies that manifest “humility” (Jasanoff 2003) may well be attractive in the face of socio-
ecological crises, but humility, in the existing material-semiotic ordering of international relations, 
is not a virtue sought after in energy technology. Not only does China have the largest number of 
nuclear reactors in the world listed as “under construction”, its foray into barge mounted small 
modular reactor designs are directly fuelled by its perceived need to power its presence on islands 
in the South China sea that are far from the mainland (see NEI, 2016 for more details). These 
islands are links in the Maritime Silk Road, which is in turn crucial to the larger Belt and Road 
Initiative being promoted under President Xi as a strategy for China’s resurgence as a preeminent 
global power.
The intersections of nuclear power, “the progressive state,” and international relations is apparent 
in post-Fukushima debates about nuclear energy in Japan. At a 2012 seminar on the topic organised 
by Keidanren, John Hamre, the CEO of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington DC, warned the Japanese that “a ‘zero-nuclear’ Japan will be a serious concern for the 
United States as its key ally both from economic and security standpoints.” He went on to note 
that there is “too much of a romantic idea about alternative energy in this country [Japan] as a 
substitute for nuclear power.” Further, he noted, “there can’t be any romanticism about alternative 
energy. If you’re going to be a modern, sophisticated economy, you have to address this question 
of making nuclear power a legitimate source of energy.” And, perhaps most tellingly, he asserted 
that “if you are going to stay a rich and prosperous country, and if you’re going to help provide 
a global system of security, we’ve got to rebuild confidence that the government … can oversee 
this (nuclear) industry and make sure that it’s safe and reliable” (quoted in The Japan Times 2012: 
15). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who came to power in December 2012 is keen to restart Japan’s 
domestic reactors and has vigorously pitched nuclear power as an important Japanese export in 
the so-called “three arrows” (fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, international competitiveness) for 
powering the Japanese economy. It is notable that this advice comes at a time when confidence in 
the post-war American guarantee of Japanese security is showing signs of weakness in the face of 
an assertive China.
All the permanent members of the UN Security Council have, as a group, refused to reconsider nuclear 
energy in the post-Fukushima shake-up of the nuclear energy status quo. Against considerable 
technical and economic odds, these countries persist in keeping their nuclear expertise and know-
how alive. They want to hold out, given the unprecedented and unmatched power that nuclear 
energy has the potential to release [see Gattie (2018), who recommends this approach as a “security 
imperative” for the United States]. This outcome fits with our main argument - countries which 
aspire to global power have overwhelmingly sought to acquire and retain nuclear power themselves. 
Similarly, incipient or aspiring regional powers, such as Japan, India, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
continue to maintain, invest in or eagerly seek nuclear power as an energy policy option.
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A Fig Leaf for the Mushroom Cloud and Other Illusions
The final discursive element that constitutes the discourse of power considered here is essentially 
a sleight of hand. The atom’s promise of unhinged energy abundance was used to veil the wanton 
destruction that the atom’s energy first delivered. It was used to rationalise a less-than-sound 
rhetoric of “peaceful” nuclear power. This was achieved by embedding nuclear power into the 
politics of productivity, a discursive step that was evocatively delivered by President Eisenhower 
as “atoms for peace” at the UN General Assembly in 1953. It was not enough, the president 
observed, “to take this (nuclear bomb) weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into 
the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace” 
(Eisenhower 1953).
The problem with this plea was that everyone knew that the laws of nuclear physics had little say 
over the choice between a peaceful and belligerent atom. For instance, even in 1948, in a speech to 
the Constituent Assembly of India, Prime Minister Nehru, while struggling to balance idealism and 
political realism in a speech on nuclear power noted, “…I think we must develop it (nuclear power) 
for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. It is in that hope that we should develop this. Of 
course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of 
any of us will stop the nation from using it that way” (quoted in Abraham 1998:49). The physics and 
engineering of nuclear energy is synonymous with “dual use”; and “atoms for peace” if it meant 
anything, was an idea beholden to the exigencies of geopolitics.
Once the atom was successfully tamed, to deliver destruction on command, as demonstrated in 
1945, the US government was confronted with the question of what to do with this know-how. Must 
it share it or keep it secret? The Acheson-Lilienthal Report was commissioned to answer that question. 
The report concluded “atomic energy plays so vital a part in contributing to the military power, to 
the possible economic welfare, and no doubt to the security of a nation, that the incentive to other 
nations to press their own developments is overwhelming” (Lilienthal et al. 1946: 9). It proposed 
the international control of atomic energy to pre-empt an atomic arms race if the technology was 
monopolised. But the idea of international control over atomic energy was already undermined in 
the 1945 Potsdam Conference during which, as Sherwin (1977: 227) observes, “the steady course 
toward a post war atomic armaments arms race … passed several important markers.” When the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report arrived in 1946, it failed to avert mistrust over geopolitical ambitions, 
misunderstanding and hawkishness from poisoning relations between Truman and Churchill on 
one side and Stalin on the other (Sherwin 1977).
After the USSR caught up with the US in nuclear know-how, and the arms race became a reality, 
“atoms for peace” served as the ideological basis for commercial selling of nuclear power technology 
to “allies” (Abraham 1998). Many countries on both sides of the erstwhile iron curtain embarked 
on similar programs. The net result was the humanisation and sanitisation of nuclear power by 
asserting it as an essential accoutrement of the politics of productivity. This was particularly 
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important in liberal democracies where atomic energy had become unpalatable after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. It assuaged domestic concerns regarding nuclear power and legitimised the maintenance 
and expansion of the sector that had tremendous strategic importance. But as it turns out, the 
“frightening legacy” of the “atoms for peace” discourse readily reveals the hand it was built on. As 
Mian and Glaser (2008) conclude, it has resulted in widespread availability of fissile material, and 
the proliferation of weapons that haunts the world today.
While “atoms for peace” rationalised nuclear power despite the atomic madness of the cold war, 
climate change now offers a new vocabulary to justify the commitment to nuclear power. The atom 
now promises energy abundance in a carbon-constrained world. This proposition is alluring to 
many influential actors in the discourse of power on the stage of realist international relations (e.g. 
George W. Bush-Whitehouse 2005; Blackwill 2005). A recent dose of discursive production in India 
was delivered by Jairam Ramesh (former Minister of Environment and Forests), who observed that 
India’s nuclear programme needed “new adrenalin” if it was to help the country address climate 
change (Ramesh 2014). But Mian and Glaser (2008) warn that this round of climate change induced 
nuclear commerce like its cold war precedent could set off a dangerous cycle of proliferation and 
repeat history. But before that, we need to ask if being nominally “carbon free”, as nuclear power 
is purported to be, can justify a “green” appellation?
A crucial requirement of economic arrangements today is to produce a blueprint for life within the 
energy and material space available for human appropriation. This suggests that environmental 
governance needs to complement efficiency measures with “sufficiency” in organising nature-
society relations (Sachs 1993). This turn to sufficiency has at least two requirements. First, it 
requires specification of the purpose of economic activity and growth. What is sufficient? What 
are the ends that economic activity seeks to achieve? It can’t any longer be simply – “more”. In 
turn this requires space in environmental governance for reflexive engagement with normative 
formulations of the ends (goals, purpose) of economic development, energy and environmental 
policy. Further, environmental governance needs to define a good life within the constraints 
of planetary boundaries and ecological justice. This requires procedural, organisational and 
institutional spaces within energy and environmental policy that are deliberative.
The second requirement is a technological infrastructure that enables the reflexive and deliberative 
spaces discussed above. It builds on an identity of technology less as an inert permanently 
fixed thing but more as an instantiation of an agreement among different normative and 
political possibilities of development (Feenberg 1991). Viewing energy technology through this 
constructivist lens as embodiments of situated meanings in discursive processes offers a vantage 
to query the supposed greenness of nuclear power. Will a big nuclear power infrastructure enable 
energy policy making to be nimble and reflexive of the evolving understanding of the need for and 
varieties of transformative social change? When faced with the need to complement efficiency 
strategies with sufficiency in environmental governance, does nuclear power promise to be an 
appropriate energy infrastructure option? Can it help the transactions of, the dance of, the drama 
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of democracy and public reasoning essential for reclaiming reflexivity in energy-society relations 
in the Anthropocene?
Consider how atomic energy fares in the context of these demands. It is built in units that are 
often gigawatt (109) scale and in installations that house multiple such reactors. It is a centralised 
technology with limited responsiveness to subjective, contextually located assessments and 
evaluations of quality of life. An initiative such as India’s three-stage nuclear (see Kakodkar 
2008; Bucher 2009) program does not even have a conception of sufficiency in it. Its sequential, 
interdependent, stage-wise design and implementation presumes and locks in an ever increasing 
energy supply (and demand as a necessary corollary) as an end in itself. The rationale for building 
uranium fuelled first-stage reactors is to furnish ingredients (plutonium) necessary as fuel in 
the second-stage breeder reactors with a much higher cumulative capacity, and eventually the 
ingredients to enable thorium based breeders in the third-stage, where it claims an unlimited ability 
to generate electricity. Similarly, the rationale behind the now always imminent arrival of fusion 
reactors is not one derived from measured and reflexive demand for energy, but instead a demand 
for electricity presumed to be as abundant as hydrogen in the oceans! Such a discursive formation 
embodied in an authoritarian energy infrastructure such as nuclear power is not conducive to the 
kind of reflexivity required by energy technologies for this new century, and renders its claim to 
greenness farfetched. Not only was atoms for peace a fiction, the idea of green nuclear power as 
well is unviable (Mathai 2013a).
International Relations on a Shared and Finite Planet
The near universal policy commitment to open-ended economic expansion through large-scale 
industrialisation, a culture of consumption ad infinitum and the general policy predisposition in 
favour of technical configurations that maximise energy and material throughput, rests on two 
assumptions that are taken to be axiomatic. First, that these policy commitments alleviate poverty 
and improve well-being. This idea goes back to the early modernisation project where massive, 
centralised wealth creation, subsequently redistributed through a well-meaning state, formed the 
cornerstone of liberal democracies as well as secular totalitarian regimes. That a commitment to 
wealth creation in this manner has alleviated destitution and material deprivation in important 
ways is easily borne out by the twentieth century. However, it is equally evident that the association 
between wealth created in such a manner and human well-being is nuanced - it is not a linear or 
proportional relationship. The returns in terms of well-being outcomes grow rapidly at early stages 
of energy availability or income growth, but soon taper off. Further additions to income or energy 
after that point result in negligible improvements in well-being, if that. This relationship has been 
qualified and usefully discussed from varying perspectives (e.g. HDR 2010; Smil 2010; Guha 2006; 
Sen 1987; Mumford 1966).
Second, the above policy commitments are deemed prerequisites for the maintenance of national 
sovereignty and/or the balance of power in international relations. Neither environmental 
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movements nor the environmental governance discourse seem to acknowledge and examine its 
implications. No doubt, concerns of international relations have long figured in environmental 
governance and its activism where environmental degradation and resource depletion are considered 
triggers of social disturbance, conflicts and disruptive mass migrations (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1991). 
For instance, this thinking is reflected in the 2012 National Academy of Sciences report that warned 
the U.S. strategic community to prepare for the national security implications of climate change 
impacts such as droughts, floods, inundation and forced migrations. Others argue that focusing on 
the security implications, both for metropolitan centres of environmental degradation as well as 
scarcities and ecological refugees from the periphery, as the defining environmental-international 
relations problematic, is neither impelled by evidence nor is it politically insightful. Instead as 
Dalby (2012) suggests, in the context of climate change and geopolitics, our focus must be on the 
consequences of the existing norms of geopolitics for climate change and not vice versa.
Taking the environmental crisis and India’s response to it, Mathai (2010) discusses how geopolitical 
considerations were a driver for India’s continued investment in an energy intensive economic 
development model with its attendant technical configurations, such as civilian nuclear power and 
the gamut of social and environmental risks and consequences. Developing this line of thinking 
further, Mathai (2013b) argues that maximising the development of power resources (energy 
throughput, industrial productivity, capital circulation and accumulation) is seen as essential 
by select nation-states to sustain their geopolitical rivalries and competition for preserving or 
challenging various hegemonies. The problem here however, is that while increasingly efficient 
technical capabilities have assuaged some of the environmental impacts of this pursuit of power, 
they have not dissociated, in any consequential way, the dependence of the accrual of power on 
energy and material throughput, or its socio-ecological consequences. In short, geopolitics and 
the race between select nation-states to accrue more power significantly undermines the quest for 
greater fairness on a finite planet.
This is particularly interesting because reflections on the nature of technology or nuclear power, 
specifically, are often set against a background of geopolitics – including war and Cold War – 
inspired mobilisation of tremendously powerful technological capabilities. Authors usually take 
the approach of unravelling, with great insight, the nature of technology and its implications for 
justice and democratic control. For instance, in an insightful discussion on “Complexity and Loss 
of Agency”, Winner (1977: 299-300) asks “are large, complex technological system always amenable 
to guidance even by those in the most obvious and powerful positions of control?” Taking the case 
of Kaiser Wilhelm who having mobilised his forces, for what went on to become World War I, was 
unable to recall the mobilisation when he had second thoughts,7 Winner concluded that this “vast 
system of warfare was unstoppable even by his (the Kaiser’s) imperial command”.
7 It was conveyed to him later that day that the British would consider intervening to keep France neutral in the coming 
conflict (Winner 1977).
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Another STS classic, Lewis Mumford’s Pentagon of Power (1970) insightfully diagnosed a stillborn 
“neotechnics” he envisioned as a younger more hopeful man in Technics and Civilization (1934). 
After the experience of the Second World War and the Manhattan Project, Mumford recounted how 
the great promises of the enlightenment in science and technology were taken hostage and the 
possibility of redemption of the relatively innocent youthful waywardness, such as “paleotechnic 
capitalism” in the nineteenth century, was surrendered. He explained how in the context of 
war, powerful institutions (military, industry and academia) in the United States coalesced to 
build a “modern megamachine” that ultimately disempowered individuals in exchange for the 
“megatechnic bribe”. The background to this story as well is geopolitics and the realism that 
pervades international relations. Yet the discussion in this book, and the STS literature, more 
broadly, has proceeded by critiquing “authoritarian technics” and the “loss of autonomy”. These 
are valid and highly insightful no doubt, but they do not generate conversations on contemporary 
norms of international relations and their impact on technology choice.
The Acheson-Lilienthal report concluded, that if one country has atomic weapons, then all would 
want them. Even if not all countries, this does impel an awareness in the STS literature of international 
relations. As discussed above this has tended not to be the case. This is an uncharted subsidiary agenda 
and a space for inter-disciplinary collaboration between technology studies scholars, international 
relations practitioners and students of nuclear power. From the vantage of sustainability it requires 
that the environmental movement’s engagement with nuclear power, and more broadly, STS’s 
engagement with technology choice, go beyond material, social and organisational considerations. 
Similarly, from the opposite direction, it requires that norms of international relations and their 
impact on economic development thinking that legitimises nuclear power and similar powerful 
and authoritarian technologies be problematised. It requires scrutiny of the political maturity of 
international relations norms in light of the Anthropocene. In keeping with the promethean know- how 
available today, can international relations move beyond rationalisations emergent from nationalist 
tropes of “exceptionalism” and “greatness” and accompanying mechanisms for domination? Can the 
Enlightenment’s children become enlightened?
Conclusion
In the relatively carbon naïve world of the twentieth century, nuclear power was counted on 
to deliver missiles by the great powers, while their energy was furnished by the unprecedented 
encounter between technology, capital and fossilised hydrocarbons. Nuclear power averaged out 
at 15% of electricity production when that era ended about two decades ago. In the emergent 
carbon constrained discourse, the former great powers and other states with now incipient or 
revived global ambitions pursue nuclear power for bombs or the possibility of bombs as a valuable 
negotiating card, and as a longer-term hedge for the energy needs of economic engines needed 
to drive geopolitical priorities and ambitions. This is why, we offer, atomic energy persists in 
the energy policy discourses of nation-states invested in great power games, even in the post-
Fukushima era.
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This explanation for the persistence of nuclear power is often overlooked by scrutiny critical of 
nuclear power. The latter rightly emphasise nuclear power’s technical and economic pitfalls as an 
energy technology. They also point to the spectre of weapons proliferation and nuclear annihilation 
as reasons for abandoning the technology. However, they are yet to widely recognise and engage 
that part of their respective governments’ commitment to atomic energy rationalised by norms of 
international relations and the ensuing discourse of power. Such rationalities of power are not neat 
Cartesian, linear and short-term logics. For instance, the rationalities of national ‘exceptionalism’ or 
‘greatness’ or ‘historical victimisation’ or worse, jingoism, fall radically beyond the epistemological 
grasp of technology and economic assessments relied on extensively to critique nuclear power as 
an energy policy option. This is an important reason why these critiques remain largely ineffective, 
as witnessed by the continuing persistence of nuclear power in energy policy.
The logics of realism and zero-sum one-upmanship in international relations that impel the 
discourse of power are simply not feasible on a finite planet. But they can’t be simply wished away. 
Such logics and their role in energy policy need to be acknowledged. They must be recognised as 
derived from humanity’s primordial instincts - forms of tribalism that nation-states constantly 
stoke and sometimes retreat into with catastrophic consequences. In this reading of the persistence 
of nuclear power, the evolution of more mature norms for international relations commensurate 
with contemporary civilisation’s Promethean capabilities is imperative.
In a context of constantly insecure great power relations, it is more likely than not that all means 
available to accrue power, if they are possible, become necessary. Nuclear power, in particular and 
authoritarian technologies in general, suffer this fate. Critical scrutiny by social activists, policy 
advocates and academics that does not acknowledge and seek to transform this anachronistic 
reality of international relations will not dislodge the persistence of nuclear power.
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